In philosophy and the social sciences, rationality is understood from several different perspectives. One perspective treats rationality as a normative concept, meaning that it establishes standards for how people ought to think and act. From this viewpoint, individuals are considered rational when they hold well-justified beliefs, pursue reasonable goals, make sound judgments, and choose actions that maximize their expected benefits or utility. Rational decision-making is therefore associated with selecting the course of action most likely to achieve one's objectives based on the available evidence. Decisions that maximize expected utility are generally regarded as more rational than those that do not.

A second perspective comes from the traditional theory of mind, which defines reason as a higher mental faculty unique to human beings. According to this view, humans are considered rational because they possess the capacity for reasoning, unlike other animals. Consequently, any behavior that results from the exercise of reason is viewed as rational.

Some theorists equate rationality with self-interest, arguing that rational individuals act to promote their own welfare. However, rationality and self-interest are not identical. While rational behavior may involve considering one's own interests, it does not require exclusive self-concern. Rationality also allows for altruistic actions that promote the well-being of others, provided such actions are based on reasoned judgment.

                   Process of Rationalization of Society

Max Weber, using his ideal type method, classified the types of human social action into: 1) goal rational, 2) value rational, 3) affective, and 4) traditional. Goal-rational social action is aimed at choosing the most efficient means to achieve the set goals, but other possible goals are taken into account, as well as the resources that should be used to achieve the goal. Value-rational social action is aimed at achieving a goal, which is important in itself, regardless of the chances of success and resources spent because it is believed in the absolute value of that goal. Weber believed that modern Western society was going through the process of increased use of goal-rational action, and this process is known as rationalization.

According to Weber, there are only three legitimate forms of authority: legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic. The difference between these three types of authority is in how authority is justified, but also according to how the administrative apparatus of society is organized. Legal-rational authority is historically a product of Western culture. It is characterized by the application of impersonal laws through official state bodies. The administrative apparatus is hierarchically and bureaucratically organized. All persons are subject to the same laws, including those performing the most important functions. In addition, there is a separation of official duty from the private life of those in administrative positions, as well as the separation of public property from personal property. Apart from the level of the modern state, the rational authority also appears in several different types of organizations and institutions.

Weber is also known for his study of bureaucracy, which he viewed as the most rational mechanism for governing the state and other organizations and institutions. Bureaucracy enables efficient and systematic management of a large number of people and material resources. Although the rudiments of bureaucracy appeared with the first civilizations, it was not until the nineteenth century that bureaucratic management spread to all aspects of social life. This development and expansion of bureaucracy were made possible by the creation of a centralized state, an increase in traffic and communication systems, an increase in the monetary economy, an increase in tax revenues, and the development of industry. The development of bureaucracy is most closely related to the development of a legal-rational type of authority. Within a bureaucratic organization, individuals are connected hierarchically, each position has specific powers and duties, and there are clear relationships of superiority and subordination. There are general formalized rules that all members must strictly follow. The duties and salary of each person are precisely defined, the prospects for progress within the organization are known, and job qualifications are acquired through schooling or special exams. Bureaucracy is guided by instrumental rationality, and its advantages are: predictability, speed, resource savings, and uniformity. Weber argues that rationalization of society has led to disenchantment of the world.

Ferdinand Tönnies, in Community and Society (1887), introduced dichotomous division into "community" (Gemeinschaft) and "society" (Gesellschaft- also sometimes translated as „association“) as the two main ideal types of human groups. The community was the first, in the historical sense, and it is created by the „natural will“ (Wesenwille). The community is a place of common life, and the best examples of the community are household and family, neighborhood, village and rural life, and ethnic communities (which are connected by customs, language, and religion). Society emerged with the rise of urban culture, customs, and attitudes of the capitalist class (the third class at the time of the French Revolution). Society is characterized by „rational will“ (Kürwille), and the main examples are the city, joint stock companies, scientific institutions, and the like. The community is similar to a living organism, while society is transitory and superficial and similar to a mechanical aggregate or artifact. A community is formed spontaneously through long-term "organic" development and is determined by emotions, customs, traditions, solidarity, trust, and intimacy. Societies are created by planned, conscious, and rational action, and the relations of rationality, calculation, selfishness, and emotional distance prevail in them. While relations and order in the community are maintained through tradition and solidarity, society is governed by formal regulations and external sanctions.

In Reason and Culture (1992), Ernest Gellner argued that rationality should be understood not only in terms of individual actions but also as a characteristic of different societies and their systems of knowledge. From a historical perspective, he maintained that modern societies are distinguished by the dominance of science, a form of knowledge based on empirical evidence and testing. According to Gellner, scientific knowledge has driven unprecedented economic growth and increasingly replaced traditional beliefs with secular, evidence-based understanding. He viewed the rise of science as part of a broader worldview that makes modern society fundamentally different from pre-modern societies.

In Weber's footsteps, Karl Mannheim continued to study rationality, so he introduced the difference between “substantial rationality” and “functional rationality”. Substantial rationality is more phenomenological, and it represents an understanding of the interdependence of factors in a particular situation, so this kind of rationality is a source of creativity and originality. Substantial irrationality represents the absence of substantive rationality and is characterized by impulsive and emotional responses to a specific situation. Functional rationality is more empirical, and it enables people to achieve a pre-set goal in an efficient way. Functional irrationality encompasses any action that prevents the practical achievement of a goal.

In the book Dialectics of Enlightenment (1947), co-written by Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno, the authors argue that, in Western culture, as a consequence of the Enlightenment, the instrumental form of formal rationality dominates, and the goal of that rationality is to achieve control over human action and society, through dehumanized science and technology. Capitalist societies, through the culture industry and dehumanized science and technology, destroy any real opposition by either assimilating or neutralizing it. In these societies, all models of social communication become monolithic and lead to cultural indoctrination. Modern society is becoming an iron cage of total administration, consumerism, and resignation.

In Religion in a Secular Society (1966), Bryan Wilson defines the process of secularization as "the fact that religion—seen as a way of thinking, as the performance of particular practices, and as the institutionalization and organization of these patterns of thought and actions— has lost influence" (Wilson, 1966). This process of secularization happens, at the same time, on three levels - societal, individual, and institutional. Secularization leads to more and more people looking at the world around them in rational and empirical categories. In that sense, Wilson believes that a rational approach to life and the world is an essential enemy of religion.

He singles out three factors that led to increased rationalization and declining influence of religion: 1) ascetic Protestantism that promoted rational and pragmatic ethics, 2) rational organization of society, state, and organization (this process Wilson calls societalization), 3) development of social and natural science, 4) the rise of rational ideologies, 5) the development of technology and industry, 6) the rise of cities and their importance.

                              Rational Choice Theory

In his books Individual Interests and Collective Action (1986) and Foundations of Social Theory (1990b), James Coleman applies the rational choice theory to the behavior of individual actors. He believes that this theoretical approach has an obvious advantage because it starts from the assumption that the behavior of actors depends on their interests and their power. On the other hand, this theory provides an excellent basis for explaining how large organizations are formed and how they operate, as well as how social exchange and collective action take place. Coleman starts from elementary actions and relationships in order to build a macro theory. Actors have interests, and they control some of the resources they use to pursue those interests. Some resources and events, however, are completely under someone else's control. To achieve interests, actors exchange control over resources and events that are less important to them to gain control over things that are more important to them.

                              Luhmann’s View of Rationality

Niklas Luhmann redefines rationality away from traditional, subject-centric human philosophy and classical metaphysics into a systems-theoretical concept. Instead of a single universal standard of human reason, rationality becomes the internal capacity of a social system to observe and manage the difference between itself and its environment.

Core Principles of Luhmann's Rationality:

Rejection of the Subject: Rationality does not belong to individual human consciousness or actors; it is an emergent property of operations and communications within specific social systems.

System-Environment Distinction: Rationality is formally defined as the "re-entry" of the distinction between a system and its environment back into the system itself, allowing the system to reflect on its own boundaries.

Plurality of Rationalities: Modern society is functionally differentiated (split into subsystems like law, economy, science, and politics). Each subsystem operates by its own code (e.g., true/false for science, payment/non-payment for economy) and possesses its own distinct internal rationality without a central coordinator.

Embracing Contingency: Rather than trying to eliminate uncertainty or find absolute objective truths, modern rationality acknowledges that things could always be otherwise, using this awareness of contingency to stabilize and adapt the system.

Paradoxical Nature: True rationality is inherently paradoxical because a system cannot fully step outside itself to observe its own blind spots, making absolute universal rationality a structural impossibility.

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