Power, also known as political power or social power, refers to the ability to influence social outcomes. Alhough power is something that people understand intuitively, it is hard to define. Max Weber gave one of the first definitions of power: "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (Weber, 1922). Robert Dahl defines power as “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Dennis Wrong defines power as “the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others". For the purpose of this entry, we will use this definition of power: "the stable capacity of some individual or collective actors to produce intended and foreseen effects on individual and collective actors, and/or any area of social life (economy, culture, politics, etc.)".
Power can vary in several ways: 1) resources or means, 2) the strength of power, 3) area or domain of power, and 4) forms of power.
Individual and collective actors can use various resources or means to achieve and exercise power: money and wealth, physical power (soldiers and weapons), personal authority and charisma, knowledge and information, social connections (social capital), cultural knowledge (cultural capital), oratory and debate skills, social status, organizational resources, etc.
The strength of power varies, as power can be exercised over a small or large number of people. Furthermore, its effects may vary in the range of actions it regulates, and in outcomes - from significant consequences involving life and death to minor changes in behavior.
The area or domain of power can vary in its scope, including the areas of life and society that it regulates – politics, economy, law, art, science, technology, religion, etc.
The exercise of power can take several forms, with the most important being: coercive power, rewards (positive sanctions), authority, persuasion, reciprocity, and machination.
Coercive power refers to the use or threat of using negative sanctions (punishment or deprivation) to achieve intended effects. In democratic states, only courts are legally allowed to use severe negative sanctions in the form of imprisonment or monetary fines. Companies and other types of organizations can also impose negative sanctions on individuals employed in those organizations in the form of job termination, pay cuts, moves to a lower position, etc. Authoritarian regimes and organized crime groups often exert, although illegally, the most severe negative sanctions in the form of murder, physical punishment, torture, etc.
Rewarding power refers to the ability to use positive sanctions (money, employment or promotion, physical rewards, etc.) in order to achieve intended outcomes.
Authority refers to situations in which individuals obey directives and instructions of individuals in formal or informal positions of power and status, not because of the use of negative or positive sanctions, but because of the sense of obligation and/or submission. Individuals obey or comply with directions of authority figures, because the former A person or institution is authoritative when other people trust it believe that later posses knowledge or virtue, and are likely to respect and obey it what that person or institution says or advises. Respect for authority figures might come from some formal position, such as president, director, or priest, and that situation is referred to as legal authority.
Persuasion is the ability to ensure compliance with the strength of arguments, or through a prolonged process of socialization and propaganda. Socialization is a long-term process of imbuing children and adults with values that support the dominant ideological and political system in a society. The most common vehicles of socialization are family, educational institutions, religion, media, literature and etc. The goal of socialization is to integrate individuals into wider society via the passive adoption of dominant values, as they are presented to be rational and self-evident. Propaganda, on the other hand, refers to open and deliberate methods of influence and persuasion with the intention that the audience of propaganda actively adopt new ideas, or strengthen belief in ideas that they already had. The most important tools of propaganda are books, pamphlets, public rallies, media, movies, etc. Propaganda tends to provoke strong emotional and intellectual reactions and often entails manipulation and deception.
Reciprocity, in this context, refers to quid pro quo relations, that is, when two sides exchange similarly valued things or favours, in order for both sides to achieve some political goal. For example, when one member of parliament votes for a bill that another member of parliament wants to see passed, and in return, that other member of parliament votes for a bill that the first one wants to see passed. In these situations, both sides possess similar power, so the relation is reciprocal.
Machinations refer to long-term, complicated, secret, and often crafty plans or schemes designed to gain power, control, or an unfair advantage. Unlike a simple or direct plan, a machination involves concealment of intentions and multiple hidden moving parts. Machinations can take the form of political maneuvering, corporate scheming, or conspiracy.
In addition to individuals, various collective actors also possess and exercise power: institutions, companies, churches, NGOs, mass movements, workers' unions, political parties, social classes, nation-states, and international organizations.
Power in the Perspective of Marxism
Karl Marx claims that the capitalist class monopolizes political power and creates laws that protect its (capitalist) property, as well as its class interests, and thus dominates the working class. In this sense, the entire capitalist state and its institutions are only a reflection of the interests of the ruling capitalist class. Marx was very critical of the bureaucracy, which, through formalized procedures, secrets, and hierarchies, turns the goals of the state into its own goals so that the bureaucracy acts as an imaginary state next to the real state.
The relations of production in capitalism create a specific type of social superstructure that aims to preserve the reproduction of such relations of production. Hence, in addition to direct political control, the capitalist class creates an ideology that aims to justify and legitimize existing relations of production and capitalist exploitation and domination. The capitalist class, with its ideology that uses the ideas of equality and freedom, achieves, to other members of society, to disguise the basis of exploitation and domination on which that class rests. However, equality, freedom, and civil rights are an illusion, because the worker is neither free nor equal to the capitalist. The worker is not free, because he is forced to work for the capitalist in order to survive. The worker is not equal either, because all political power and ideological narrative are created and held by the capitalist class. That is why Marx sees ideology as a „false consciousness“, that is, a false image of society and the world. Marx believes that capitalist control over political power and ideological narrative will not be able to prevent the collapse of the capitalist system when the contradictions within the social base become too great.
One of the key consequences of the capitalist relations of production and the ideology that defends them is what Marx calls "alienation." Alienation occurs when workers in capitalism begin to view the things they produce as foreign objects. They see goods as something foreign to them, and that has the power to control people. „Productive labor“ is the primary and most important human activity, in which people truly express their own being. When people give up the products of their labor to place them on the market as goods, they then lose a part of themselves. Workers are alienated not only from the things they produce but also from the whole system - economic flows and impersonal market forces of supply and demand, as well as from the ruling ideology and institutions that support capitalist domination. Eventually, workers become alienated from themselves. Religion is one of the main examples of human alienation and, as a value and as an institutional system, it plays a crucial role in protecting and justifying capitalist domination. Marx believes that "man makes religion, religion does not create man."People attribute their own powers to supra-empirical forces and thus become alienated from themselves. Since religion is the most important source of alienation, people must abolish religion and religious illusions and myths, so they can become truly free.
Friedrich Engels argued that in the 19th century industrial capitalists managed to become the dominant class in the most developed countries, replacing the aristocracy and large landowners from the top. The capitalists secured their power by introducing parliamentary democracy (in which they control parliament), legal equality, and free market principles.
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), Friedrich Engels uses anthropological and archaeological research to study the historical conditions of marriage, family, private property, and the economy, as well as political relations and states. With the historical invention of animal husbandry, there came a sharp jump in the level of economic production, and this led to the emergence of slavery, because, for the first time in history, defeated members of another tribe could be of economic benefit to the victor as slave labor. With cattle breeding comes the greater economic role of men, so they also become owners of cattle and slaves. This also leads to changes in family relations, as it causes patrilineal calculation of kinship and the right of inheritance of property only through the paternal line, which, in the end, leads to the fall of matriarchy and the arrival of patriarchy to power. Men came to power, while women became subordinate to male autocracy, and their purpose became only to serve and give birth to children. Patriarchy, unlike matriarchy, where relations between the sexes would be more equal, introduces the autocracy of men as the heads of the family, not only over women but also over children and family slaves. With the introduction of animal husbandry and later agriculture, economic development and technological discoveries took place. This paved the way for the emergence of crafts and the division of labor into agriculture and crafts. Craft production leads to the creation of products intended for exchange; therefore, comes the advent of commodity production and trade.
With economic growth comes increasing economic stratification, while land ownership shifts from local communities to full private ownership. All this leads to an increase in population density and the creation of large alliances of tribes, formed to wage wars of conquest and defense, and headed by military leaders. By transforming the leadership from the occasional military leader into a permanent and formal position of power, a hereditary monarchy is formed. The division of individuals from the same gentes into poor and rich landowners leads to the disintegration of the genetic order of society, and the creation of classes and hereditary nobility. The disintegration of the gentile organization into a class organization led to the formation of the first state and civilization. Thus, the state emerges as a political expression and organ of power for the economically dominant class of large landowners and slaveholders. The formation of the state leads to the further development of trade, which in turn led to the creation of a separate mercantile class, metal money, money market, lending of money and interest payments, and loan-sharing. The formation of the state also leads to the creation of a state bureaucracy that serves to organize the army and collect taxes.
With the emergence of the state and the disintegration of kinship gentes, marriage ceases to be controlled by complex kinship ties but begins to be based only on the material and class interests of the fathers of future newlyweds. With the development of industrial capitalism in the modern age, family control over marriage declined, and the freedom of choice of marital partners grew, but class origin was still crucial for the choice of marital partners. In civil law, marriage begins to be treated like any other contractual relationship, which has its own precisely defined economic obligations and duties.
Power and Authority in the Perspective of Max Weber
Max Weber, in Economy and Society (1922), examines relations of power and authority. Weber defines political power as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rest" (Weber, 1922). Weber defines authority as: “probability that certain commands (or all commands) from a given source will be obeyed by a given group of persons” (Weber, 1922). While power relations can be a product of circumstances, authority relations are never a product of chance because authority represents institutionalized relations of superiority and subordination, so they are always part of the established moral order.
There are only three legitimate forms of authority: legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic. The difference between these three types of authority is in how authority is justified, but also according to how the administrative apparatus of society is organized. Legal-rational authority is historically a product of Western culture. It is characterized by the application of impersonal laws through official state bodies. The administrative apparatus is hierarchically and bureaucratically organized. All persons are subject to the same laws, including those performing the most important functions. In addition, there is a separation of official duty from the private life of those in administrative positions, as well as the separation of public property from personal property. Apart from the level of the modern state, the rational authority also appears in several different types of organizations and institutions.
Traditional power rests on the sanctity of long-established norms and institutions, while, at the same time, there is a constant distrust in any type of change. The right to exercise power is not strictly separated from the person in power, and there is no clear distinction between private and public property. There are two main forms of traditional power: patrimonial, in which all subjects are completely dependent on the ruler and all those who occupy lower positions remain on them only while enjoying his favor; and feudal, in which the highest classes have their protected status, and they form the administrative apparatus. The feudal nobility swears allegiance to the ruler but is freed from his arbitrariness.
The third form of authority is charismatic authority, and this type is transitional because it occurs in periods of crisis and sudden social changes. Charismatic authority does not respect any restrictions and is always radical. The main examples of charismatic leaders are a prophet, a hero, and a demagogue. All who are below the charismatic leader owe their position only to their loyalty to the leader, while people submit to the leader only as long as he possesses charisma. This form of authority is more a relationship of power than authority. Charismatic power is very quickly transformed into a traditional, legal-rational, or class form, or charisma itself is transformed.
Power in Theoretical Approach of Talcott Parsons
Talcott Parsons, in the article “On the Concept of Political Power”, gives a definition of power: "Power is the generalized capacity to ensure the implementation of binding obligations among the components of a collective organization system, when the obligations are legitimized regarding their contribution to collective goals, and where in case of disobedience there is an assumption of coercive negative situational sanctions, regardless of the type of actual agents imposing them" (Parsons, 1963).
Parsons argues that social integration depends on loyalty to society as a whole and to the social roles individuals perform. He believes that value consensus, or agreement on shared values, is essential for maintaining social systems. Shared values create collective goals that members of society work together to achieve.
According to Parsons, power is not a zero-sum relationship in which one person’s gain necessarily means another’s loss. Instead, he views power as a variable-sum concept, meaning that it can increase or decrease depending on how it is used. Since members of society generally share common goals, power can benefit both those who exercise it and those who are subject to it. This mutual benefit encourages cooperation and reciprocity, which are essential for social stability.
Parsons also considers power inequalities necessary for achieving collective goals. Large-scale cooperation requires organisation and leadership, so certain individuals are granted authority to direct others. This authority is generally accepted as legitimate because it is believed to serve society’s interests.
Parsons illustrates this through political power in Western democracies, comparing political leaders to bankers. Citizens grant leaders power through elections, but they can withdraw this support by voting them out of office. Therefore, power ultimately belongs to society as a whole. When leaders use power effectively to achieve collective goals, both society and its members benefit, allowing the overall amount of power to increase.
Power in the Perspective of Exchange Theory
George Homans, in Social Behavior (1961), introduces the behaviorized exchange theory of power. The process of exchange is not reserved only for the economy but takes place in all aspects of social life because all interactions between individuals include seeking a reward and avoiding negative consequences. Rewards can be social or psychological, such as: recognition, support, status, satisfaction, etc. It is this desire for personal gain that drives the motivation for social exchange, not collective or symbolic forces. Homans mostly focuses on exchange interactions between two people or within small groups and does not deal with general forms of exchange at a wider level of society. People in social exchange interactions tend to benefit and avoid harm, but they also have certain expectations about the consequences of exchange, so if their expectations are met, they feel satisfaction, and if they are not, they feel dissatisfaction and anger. Homans, on the other hand, recognizes that sometimes people do not make decisions, and often do not make long-term rational calculations, which would maximize their success in interactions. Exchange takes place when both actors consider it more beneficial than their best available alternatives. In Homans’s theory, A exercises power—understood as an attempt to influence another person’s behavior—when doing so is more advantageous than any other option available to A. Similarly, B complies when compliance offers greater benefits than noncompliance. However, the accumulation of rewards produces diminishing returns. Consequently, individuals with fewer resources tend to be more responsive than wealthier individuals to offers of a given reward in exchange for performing an otherwise undesirable action.
Karen Cook, in Cooperation Without Trust (2005), discusses how trust between actors affects the "power-dependence relations" that exist between them. She believes that the relations of social exchange (in marriage, at work, or in friendly relations) contain mutual dependence, which can be defined as a relationship of "encapsulated interest". The notion of encapsulated interests refers to the trust that one actor (individual or collective) places in another actor because he (or she or they) believes that the other actor accepts the interests of the first actor and unites those interests with his own interests. Cook believes that if there is unequal power in a relationship, it is difficult to develop trust because the relative power of the actors will affect the way they experience the relationship. This theoretical approach to the relationship of power and trust can be applied to individuals, as well as to relations between organizations or between states.
Richard Emerson sought to challenge the dominant view of power in the social sciences, the view that power is possessed by individuals and institutions that control the most important resources. He believed that power lies in the very relationship between individuals and institutions, therefore, power is a relational phenomenon. The power of one person over another person is commensurate with the level to which the other person depends on the resources that the first person possesses. To define such a view of power, Emerson introduces the notion of "power-dependence relations." Such power relations are always manifested within the network of human relations. Using the concept of power-dependence relations, and within the theoretical framework of social exchange theory, Emerson studied the issues of coalition building, social cohesion, commitment, trust, and solidarity.
David Willer, in Theory and Experimental Investigation of Social Structures (1987), identifies similarities between the structural conditions that create power differences within social exchange networks, on the one hand, and the conditions that sustain coercive structures, on the other. Differences in power are a consequence of mobility in hierarchies and the process of exclusion from exchange structures. Willer tests his theory and its hypotheses in a series of laboratory experiments.
Markovsky, together with David Willer, developed network exchange theory, which seeks to quantify the effects of social structure on the power of individuals operating within a network. Within networks, the effects of social structure are diminished, so the characteristics of the individual become more pronounced. Markovsky claims that this theory can predict the relative power of different positions within the network and that the social structure has an impact on the feeling of injustice in individuals, which influences them to change their behavior.
Power in Michel Foucault’s Approach
Foucault's book, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1961), describes the history of the social attitudes towards madness, from the end of the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. At the end of the Middle Ages, people who were seen as insane were a part of everyday life and walked the streets freely. In the nineteenth century, attitudes toward insanity changed completely, and "insane people" began to be seen as a threat, and mental hospitals were built to separate insane people from the normal population.
In Discipline and Punish(1975), Foucault shows how there transpires a huge change in the way society monitors and punishes criminals. While until the end of the eighteenth century, the punishment of criminals was public and very brutal - public torture, humiliation, and the death penalty using the cruelest methods - in the nineteenth century the element of the public spectacle of punishing criminals disappeared. Instead, states started building prisons in which, far away from the eyes of the public, criminals are locked and isolated. The expression of social (state) power is no longer done through a direct and open spectacle of punishing criminals, but power starts being expressed through strict supervision and isolation of criminals. The key change that has taken place is in the techniques that the state uses to express and consolidate its power. Instead of spreading the public message with brutal public punishment, the state now emphasizes surveilling and disciplining citizens.
Foucault continues to deal with the relationship between power and knowledge in the multi-volume book The History of Sexuality, 4 vols (1978-2021, in French 1976-2018). He believes that the Victorian period was not marked by the repression of any conversation about sex and sexuality. On the contrary, in that period, medicine and psychiatry began to deal intensively with sexuality. Since then, the trend of increasing scientific classification of sexuality has continued, and this contributes to the increase of social control over that sphere. Another type of social control and expression of power in the sphere of sexuality was in the Middle Ages, when the Catholic Church used confessions in front of a priest to encourage people to talk about sex and thus gain control over sexual behavior. He believes that every society, as well as those who dominate it, strives to gain control over sexual behavior. However, this control cannot be based only on punishment, but also requires the active cooperation of ordinary subjects. Popular psychology and psychotherapy are the main ways of taking control of the discourse on sexuality in the twentieth century.
Foucault's view of the manifestation of power, control, and domination is a serious critique of the Marxist view of power. While for Marx power serves to achieve the class domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat, to achieve economic exploitation, Foucault believes that power functions in different ways in different fields and different types of relations. Power is not held by a single person, institution, or the state, but exists throughout society and operates through social relationships. Power is something that is exercised rather than possessed. Foucault studies how power manifests itself on a micro level and in everyday practices and comes to the conclusion that power is localized and fragmented. Foucault believes that society does not have a center, but multi-layered microcosms. Society represents a large impersonal system of monitoring, mobility, and diffusion, which operates through circulation chains. He emphasised the close connection between power and knowledge, suggesting that the development of state power depends on new forms of knowledge that allow populations to be classified, monitored, and controlled. For example, psychiatric knowledge creates power relationships between psychiatrists and patients. In this case, power is embedded in the discourse and practices of psychiatry, rather than being possessed by individual psychiatrists. Similarly, punishment became increasingly linked to scientific knowledge and specialist expertise, allowing experts to influence how individuals were controlled and reformed. Discourse is never strictly divided between dominant and dominated, and accepted and excluded discourses. Instead, discourse goes through complex and unstable processes and can be an instrument, and also a consequence of power, as well as a point of resistance around which the opposition strategy can be built.
Steven Lukes and Dennis Wrong on Power
Steven Lukes, in Power: A Radical View (1974), presents his theory of the three faces (dimensions) of power. The first dimension of power is the most observable and direct, and it refers to power in the decision-making processes. In this aspect, power is situated with actors (individual or collective) who are able to dominate in the decision-making process, especially in situations where there is a clear conflict of interests between different actors. The second face of power is “the power of nondecision making”. Nondecision-making power lies with actors who have control over which issues are allowed to be debated and decided and which are prevented from being discussed or decided over. The third dimension of power refers to the ability of actors to shape others' desires, wishes, and goals through manipulation, propaganda, ideology, etc. This dimension of power is hardest to directly observe and measure. Lukes, taking into account all three faces of power, defines power as: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B’s interests.”
Dennis Wrong’s book Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses (1988), is a wide-ranging theoretical examination of power in social life. Wrong seeks to clarify what power is, how it operates, and why it is central to understanding social relationships and institutions. Wrong defines power as the capacity of individuals or groups to produce intended and foreseen effects on others. He distinguishes power from related concepts such as influence, authority, force, manipulation, and coercion, arguing that sociological discussions often blur these differences. By disentangling these terms, he provides a more precise conceptual framework for analyzing power.
Wrong defines power as “"the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others". He differentiates between different forms of power: 1) coercive power (based on threats or force), 2) inducement (offering rewards), 3) persuasion (shaping beliefs through argument), 4) authority (legitimate, socially recognized power), and 5) manipulation (covert influence). He emphasizes that power is not always oppressive or illegitimate; it is a pervasive feature of all social organization, including families, workplaces, and political systems. Wrong analyzes the resources that make power possible, including control over material assets, access to information, organizational position, charisma, and social norms. He highlights that power is relational: it depends not only on what one actor possesses but also on the dependence and expectations of others.
A central theme is the distinction between naked coercion and legitimate authority. Drawing on classical sociological theory, especially Max Weber, Wrong argues that stable social order depends more on legitimacy than on force. When authority loses legitimacy, coercion becomes more visible and social stability weakens. Wrong also critiques overly deterministic or structural accounts of power (including some Marxist and elite theories), arguing that power is dispersed and situational rather than monopolized in a single center. He resists both the view that power is everywhere and the claim that it is entirely concentrated in ruling elites, advocating instead a nuanced, pluralistic understanding.
Power in the Perspective of Pierre Bourdieu
Pierre Bourdieu claimed that the analysis of power relations and the actions that individual and collective actors take to increase their own power, within different fields, is key to understanding society. Each field is the scene of more or less open fighting. Actors in dominant positions will adopt defensive and conservative strategies to preserve their status, while those in lower positions will develop subversive strategies aimed at overthrowing the governing rules, while, most often, accepting the legitimacy of the field itself.
The term field denotes a specific semi-autonomous sphere of social life that has its own logic. Each field has its institutions, its own rules, governing values, norms of behavior, and desirable goods (physical or symbolic) to be possessed. Examples of fields are: politics, science, art, religion, education, etc. Each field has its structure, that is, a network of relationships between objective positions occupied by the individual or collective actors acting within that field. The number of fields themselves and their development varies between different societies.
Bourdieu believes that each field is a stratified hierarchical system within which there are relations of power and domination. Of all the forms of power and domination, the most important are symbolic power and symbolic violence. All cultural symbols - art, food and clothing patterns, science, religion, language - serve to pursue the interests of those in power. Those at the top of the hierarchy of a field use symbols to preserve, increase and legitimize that power, so such strategies are a source of symbolic power and symbolic violence. Symbolic power and violence have the function of creating and increasing social "distinction". The distinction, conceived in this way, is a separate analytical concept in Bourdieu's approach and is the main theme of his book Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment Taste. Society is filled with the great struggle to create social distinctions, because class struggles are, in essence, struggles to create a symbolic classification of people into distinct classes. Symbolic power and symbolic violence serve to create, legitimize and preserve the distinctions that exist between social classes. When symbolic power succeeds in gaining a monopoly on the legitimacy of power relations and the "distinctions" that exist between classes within a field, then that field begins to have its doxa, that is, common sense, which serves to present power relations and distinctions as natural and self-evident. The goal of those who exercise domination is to, with the help of symbolic power, present the relations of power so legitimate and self-evident that any attempt of resistance by the oppressed is extinguished. That is why self-restraint and self-censorship, imposed on themselves by oppressed actors, are the most effective forms of reproduction of power relations.
Power in the Perspective of Anthony Giddens
Anthony Giddens singles out three types of structures: 1) structures of domination and power, 2) structures of signification and knowledge, and 3) structures of legitimation. The difference between these three types of structure is only analytical because all three types of structure work in every practical activity. In addition to structures, there are networks and systems of social relations in society, as well as relations of power and domination. The relations of power and domination exist as a set of relations between superior and subordinate groups within the institutional order of society. Such relationships are ubiquitous in all complex and large societies. Unlike most sociologists who have studied power, Giddens places greater emphasis on the balance of power, or „dialectic of control“, between superior and subordinate groups. Dominant groups base their power on the control of scarce resources, while the very nature of those resources depends on historical circumstances. However, superior groups can achieve their goals only with the active consent of subordinate groups. The ability of subordinate groups to comply with, or resist the will of superior groups provides subordinates with a significant level of bargaining power. When such bargaining power is well exercised, subordinate groups can achieve some of their goals and increase their autonomy.
Power in the Feminist Perspective
Raewyn Connell argues that gender order and gender relations are the product of everyday interactions and practices that are reproduced over time but are also subject to change. Gender order almost always contains inequalities in three areas: work, power, and personal relationships (cathexis). These three areas are interconnected and changes in one area cause changes in the other two areas. The field of work refers to the gender division of labor in the household and at work. Unequal relations of power are expressed through the relations of authority, violence, ideology, institutions, state, etc. Inequality in personal relationships appears in marriage, sexuality, and in the raising of children. Each gender order contains a large number of gender relationships.
Dorothy Smith argues that sociological knowledge is gained from the positions and views of men and creates, as the author calls them, "relations of ruling", which are a set of organized practices and discourses of the state, companies, and professional and educational organizations, which permeate multiple locations of power. Sociology overlooked both the female experience of everyday life and the female position within the macro context of capitalist society.
Smith believes that patriarchy is a dominantly organized structure of modern capitalism that exists at both the institutional and discourse levels. Although there are multiple places of power, power is always concentrated in specific institutions and practices that maintain the capitalist social order. Discourse and text mediate power in a subtle and hidden way - the state retains power through tax refunds, social security forms, and the like.
Power in the Perspective of Michael Mann
Michael Mann explores the historical development of power in four volumes of his book The Sources of Social Power (1986, 1993, 2012a, 2012b). Each of the four volumes of The Sources of Social Power deals with a different historical period. There is a significant theoretical difference between Mann's approach and other sociological directions, and this difference is reflected in the fact that Mann believes that the concept of "societies" as isolated and unitary entities is wrong because there are always relations and processes (cultural, political and economic) that connect different territories and societies. Thus, he argues that “Societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power” (Mann, 1986).
The concept of power is most important for Mann's theoretical approach, where he sees power as the ability to achieve goals through mastery of the environment. He agrees with Parsons that power is a ''generalized means" for achieving one's goals. He believes that it is necessary to study how people enter into social ties and power relations. Mann distinguishes two main types of expression of power: “distributive power” - the ability to persuade other people to act in achieving the goals of those who have power; “collective power” - the ability of one group to control another group. He introduces two more pairs of ideal types by which the types of power are distinguished. The first pair refers to the way power is used, so there is “extensive power” - control over a large population and a large territory and “intensive power” - creating a strong organization and achieving great mobilization and support of subordinates. The second pair refers to the existence of authoritative and diffuse power, where “authoritative power” is reflected in giving direct commands that must be respected, while “diffused power” is exercised in indirect ways.
The first volume explores the history of power from prehistory until 1760 AD. In this book, Mann examines how the four basic sources of power in society - ideological, economic, military, and political - have evolved and changed throughout history, from the Neolithic to the Industrial Revolution. Mann believes that each of these sources of power can be independent, so he studies why some sources of power became dominant at certain moments; that is, for example, why the ideological source of power was dominant in the period of the emergence of world religions. He believes that the ruling group is never able to fully control all power. As an example, he cites the demise of feudalism, which occurred due to the increase in the military, ideological, and economic power of the citizenry in the fourteenth century.
Power in the Theoretical Perspective of Randall Collins
Randall Collins argues that between the micro level at which the interaction rituals take place and the macrostructure, there are the mediating middle levels that are made up of networks. The main networks are social stratification and organizations. When interactional rituals occur regularly, then they form chains of interactional rituals. In organizations, chains of interaction rituals are structured around dimensions of power and status. In rituals of power, those who have more power, achieve greater emotional energy, and therefore identify more with the symbols of the organization, compared to those who do not have power. A similar thing happens within the chains of status interaction rituals, where similar effects occur.
Within each organization, different coalitions are formed that fight for power and status, and individuals are constantly trying to improve their position within the coalition and the entire organization through interactional rituals. Rituals of power and status are what make the differences in power and status, within organizations, stable and lasting. The essence is that individuals can change their own position, but those differences in power and status remain constant at the level of the entire organization.
In the article "Situational Stratification: A Micro-Macro Theory of Inequality" (2000), Collins examines how interactive rituals of power and status create stratification layers. Although Collins accepts the fact that there are growing economic differences in the United States, he believes that this does not reflect an increase in hierarchical differences. Giving epistemological and methodological primacy to situations and rituals, in relation to the study of aggregate data in the form of statistics on the distribution of wealth, Collins claims that: "Nothing has reality unless it is manifested in a situation somewhere". He believes that differences in wealth are not reflected in everyday situations. Different classes earn, invest, and spend their money within their own situations and rituals. Status groups are losing their significance because everyday life has become less formalized, so the symbols and rituals that form the basis of status groups are becoming less and less recognizable. Power relations are not projected on an everyday level, because in meetings of representatives of different classes, a subordinate position (deference) is formally expressed less and less.
Pluralist Approach to Power
The pluralistic approach refers to the point of view that argues that, in a modern democratic state, power is divided between a number of different groups and interests. Some of the most important proponents of the pluralistic approach are Alexis de Tocqueville, Robert Dahl, Seymour Martin Lipset, David Turman, Raymond Aron, Arthur Bentley, Earl Latham, Charles Lindblom and Nelson Polsby. Pluralists believe that Western democracies, such as the USA, Britain and France, are the most effective political systems for representing the interests of society. They argue that the state exercises legitimate power because it is based on public acceptance and cooperation rather than coercion. They also believe that modern industrial societies contain an increasing variety of social groups and interests, including occupational groups, trade unions and professional associations.
Although these groups may have conflicting demands, pluralists argue that no single division, such as class, gender, age, religion or ethnicity, determines everyone's interests. The state therefore acts as an impartial mediator, balancing competing demands and ensuring that different groups can influence government policy, without allowing any one group to dominate. Pluralists also believe political parties are accountable to the electorate. To win elections and remain in power, parties must gain support from a range of social groups and consider public opinion, rather than representing only one particular interest.
David B. Truman, in The Governmental Process (1951), emphasizes the role of interest groups in politics. He argues that organized groups emerge to represent shared interests and influence public policy. In The Process of Government (1908), Bentley presents politics as a process of interaction and competition among groups. His work helped establish the foundations of group theory and pluralism. In The Group Basis of Politics (1952), Latham examines how political outcomes emerge from interactions and bargaining among competing interest groups. In Politics and Markets (1977), Lindblom examines how businesses, organized interests, and political institutions influence policymaking, while also identifying inequalities in political influence. In Community Power and Political Theory (1963), Polsby supports the view that community power is dispersed among competing groups and political actors. In Democracy and Totalitarianism(1968), Raymond Aron argues that respect for the law, as well as readiness for compromise, are most important for the good functioning of these societies.
Dahl, in the book Who Governs? (1961), wanted to counter theories of the power elite, championed by Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter, which state that a small number of powerful people (elite) rule American political life. Dahl, in contrast, promotes the pluralist theory of political power. In order to test his theory empirically, Dahl created a rigid research design that was based on several premises: 1) the concept of power has to include the ability to change another person's behavior and that power has to be researched separately from the resources used to gain power; (2) that power should be observed by constructing case studies of political action; (3) the power of an individual is not necessarily on the same level in different domains of political action, (4) power should be defined in terms of the goals that the actors themselves adopt.
In Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), Dahl argued that plural societies are able to achieve democratic success if cleavages based on race, gender, wealth, power, and others are cross-cutting (memberships do not overlap) and don't reinforce each other. In the same book, he posits that majority voting doesn’t constitute a crucial threat to civil liberties and democracy.
In the article “The Concept of Power” (1957), Dahl put forward a new definition of power: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Dahl argued that this definition can be useful for comparing the power of two political actors in some given sphere, and to do so five factors have to be taken into account:” (1) differences in the basis of their power, (2) differences in means of employing the basis, (3) differences in the scope of their power, i.e., in the type of response evoked, (4) differences in the number of comparable respondents, and (5) differences in the change in probabilities, or M”. (1957: 205-206)
Dahl conducted his empirical study of political power in the city of New Haven, Connecticut. He found out that in each of the sectors of action, different individuals and groups (who were sometimes in competition with each other) had the most power, with no office holder or business leader having predominant power. The only exception was the mayor, who was powerful in all of the sectors, but, at the same time, he was accountable to voters, so his power was not unchecked. Non-elected interest groups had influence and power over the decision-making process, which Dahl saw as a positive correction and a way to introduce public interest beyond strict representative democracy. Dahl’s findings supported his pluralistic theory of political power.
Dahl’s most famous and influential book is Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971). The new conception of polyarchy presented a modified vision of democracy. While true democracy is ideal and is not achievable in real life, polyarchy was achievable and had institutional arrangements that approximate that ideal. Polyarchy had two main dimensions: 1) public contestation - open, free, fair, stable, and balanced electoral political competition between different individuals, groups, and forces; 2) inclusive suffrage and political participation -wide participation of citizens in the democratic process. The main goal of polyarchy is to have plural centers of interest and power, with no group or individual monopolizing all the power. For a polyarchy to function properly, people have to accept the legitimacy of elections and the authority of elected officials. By Dahl’s account, the US was the first country to achieve polyarchy in history. To ensure full polyarchy, all classes and demographic groups, regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or gender, have to have similar political representation, inclusion, and participation. Having a large part of the population consisting of disadvantaged groups, like the poor, is the greatest threat to polyarchy.
Wyn Grant’s article “Pressure Groups” (1999) presents an elite pluralist approach to British politics. He argues that the influence of pressure groups that were powerful in the 1970s has declined and that groups now operate in multiple arenas rather than focusing solely on Westminster and government policy. Some seek to influence people directly instead of relying on government action. Governments also consult a wider range of pressure groups, including former outsiders such as Greenpeace. However, Grant maintains that the distinction between insider and outsider groups remains important. Insider groups generally have greater influence because of their access to decision-makers, while outsider groups may achieve their aims through direct action. Overall, pressure groups support democracy, although their influence remains unequal.
Elite Theory of Power
Elite theory of power argues that in modern capitalist democracies, power is highly concentrated in one or more small elite groups. It was first advocated by Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, who supported and championed the idea of elite power, as they saw it as a positive development. Later authors who espoused elite theory, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, saw elite power as a negative force for society, economy, and democracy.
Gaetano Mosca presented his theory of power and the elite in the books Theory of Governments and Parliamentary Government (1884) and The Ruling Class (1896, 1923). As a conservative, he rejected the idea of social progress. Mosca believed that in every society there is an organized minority that rules over an unorganized majority. The mass (majority) can never be organized, because it lacks the will and instinct for it, while there are always individuals who, due to their personal qualities (intellectual or material), stand out from the mass. The ruling class, in any society, strives to legitimize its power by invoking an abstract principle that represents a "political formula", and the very nature of that principle is different in different societies and historical situations. In some societies the divine will is emphasized, and in some the ancient traditional power of the monarch. There are different cultural and material conditions in different societies, which lead to the existence of a different political organization of government and the ruling elite. One society can go through different cycles - periods in which circumstances are stable, so the elite and its source of power are petrified, as well as its stable attitude towards the masses, while there are also periods of sudden change. Sudden change can be caused by external or internal factors, but once it happens, the old elite is replaced or destroyed, and the new elite rises.
According to Mosca, a good ruling class should be composed of brave, persistent, rational, educated, and sincere politicians who are committed to the common good and gradual reforms, and are suspicious of the masses. In modern society, such a group is represented by the professional middle class, which, although it would be the best ruling class, has no power, because democracy has enabled the corrupt political elite to abuse democracy and win power. Mosca saw both democracy and socialism as enemies of the meritocratic rule of the middle class.
Vilfredo Pareto divides every society into two separate strata - the elite that should lead the masses and the masses that should obediently follow the leadership of the elite. He believes that the elites that lead always existed, even when society seems completely democratic, or when mass revolutions take place. In both cases, the elites who direct political and social actions events are at the forefront of creating social order, or at the forefront of change. However, relations between the elite and the masses are never static. There are always several parallel processes that change this dynamic.
One type of dynamic within the elite are divisions and conflicts that occur within the elite itself. In cases where such conflicts are pronounced, the subordinate classes can derive some benefit for themselves. The next type of change within the elite is related to what means (force or cunning), and in what proportions, the elite uses to maintain its elite position. In that sense, Pareto refers to the division that Niccolò Machiavelli introduced between "lions" and "foxes" as different types of leaders. Lions use only force to stay in power, while foxes use cunning to trick the masses into following them. The application of either of these two strategies depends on many circumstances, so neither has a permanent primacy over the other. When one elite becomes conservative and applies only one type of leadership, and when that type of leadership ceases to be effective, then that elite is replaced by another.This new elite came to power because it used the type of leadership, force, or cunning, that was more appropriate to the circumstances.
Joseph Schumpeter, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), argues that modern societies are complex and differentiated, different groups have different interests around which they fight, so the common good can't exist in those societies. Different groups, in modern democratic societies, are fighting for power and votes, and at the same time, they are carrying out political propaganda to which ordinary citizens are very susceptible. Topics and solutions that are the subject of political controversy are imposed on voters by politicians and not the other way around. In that sense, the popular sovereignty and rationality of the voters are a complete illusion. There is great political inequality between ordinary citizens and those with political and economic power - capitalists and corporations have economic power, politicians have their organizations and propaganda, unions have the power to lobby and negotiate, state bureaucracy controls the work and goals of state bodies, and the like. On the other hand, ordinary citizens have neither power, nor influence, nor enough information and rationality, and the only thing they have is the right to vote. In Schumpeter's view of democracy, this system becomes only an institutionally regulated procedure for electing political leadership.
Charles Wright Mills, in White Collar: The American Middle Classes (1951), argues that white-collar workers in the US are experiencing increasing alienation, both at work and outside of work. Mills saw a decline in the reputation, autonomy, power, and income of white-collar workers, and in addition to the previously mentioned causes, he cited an increase in the population with higher education, increased white-collar unemployment, and a reduction in the pay gap between white-collar workers and manual workers. University education has also transformed, so it is increasingly focused on the adoption of practical knowledge and social values that serve to better prepare students for effective integration into large bureaucratic systems in the business or government sphere.
Power in such bureaucracies occurs in three forms: 1) coercive power, 2) power based on faith in one's authority, and 3) manipulative power. Manipulative power is becoming dominant and is based on the application of sophisticated methods of science and technology. The application of the principles of scientific management and the huge centralization of decision-making enables the use of manipulative power. Manipulative power is applied less visibly, and the goal is to manipulate workers to internalize the values imposed on them by their superiors, and serve only the interests of those superiors. Outside the workplace, manipulative power is exercised through several channels: 1) mass media, which promotes entertainment and sports, while at the same time obscuring real economic and political problems, 2) through marketing that promotes consumerism, 3) through an education system that instills the values necessary for the survival of the system, and 4) through religious organizations that give the values of American capitalism a sacred aura.
In The Power Elite (1956) Mills claims that the elite in the United States controls large bureaucratic organizations within three sectors: private corporations, state administration, and the military. Members of all three mentioned elites share many common features: they were born in the upper classes, they went to the same private schools and the most elite universities, and they belong to the same private social clubs. Members of the elite who are not from the upper classes most often perform technocratic jobs: managers, professionals, and lawyers. Elites keep their positions, intergenerationally, by mostly getting married within the elite, but also on the intergenerational level, so that the same person changes positions during his career and moves from one elite to the other two. The integration of the elite is accompanied by the growing integration of these three sectors. The elite within the state administration pursues policies that suit the economic interests of corporations, the corporate elite finances the political elite, while the military elite depends on the political elite and creates a "military-industrial complex" with the corporate elite. Of these three sectors, the sector of private corporations has the greatest power.
Conflicts within the elite take place at the middle level of power, mainly over the division of spoils, and the media and political scientists pay the most attention to these conflicts, while no one questions the fundamental basis of the system itself. Conflicts within the elites are becoming increasingly integrated into the bureaucratic state apparatus, which replaces the real political struggle between political parties. Trade unions and other professional organizations tend to integrate into the state, and their leaders fight only for their own interests or for the interests of their own members. Below the elite is the class of white-collar workers, which, compared to the earlier middle class of small capitalists and professionals, has lost its autonomous power. At the bottom of the pyramid is a huge mass of ordinary people who are disorganized, uninformed, completely apathetic, indifferent, and without any real power, but are completely controlled and manipulated. The very high concentration of power that the elites have and the apathy and powerlessness of the largest part of the population, represent an exceptional threat to democracy.
The bureaucratic rationality of the elite seeks to prevent huge masses of people from approaching life's problems autonomously and rationally. As a solution to the problem of lack of democracy in the United States, Mills offers the following proposals: 1) educating the general public who would be informed and involved in making important decisions, 2) creating "nationally responsible political parties" that would clearly and openly fight for specific policies, 3) creating real intelligentsia, which would deal with the most important issues, 4) creation of strong state services independent of corporate interests, 5) formation of mass media that would properly inform the public about the most important issues, 6) creation of strong associations that would connect individuals, communities and the public.
Floyd Hunter, in Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (1953), examined patterns of community leadership and decision-making in Atlanta. Hunter introduced the term “power structure” to describe the enduring relationships through which major community policies are shaped and decided.His principal conclusion was that political reality diverged sharply from the democratic ideal of representative government. Instead, policymaking tended to revolve around networks connected to the city’s leading business figures. To identify these leaders, Hunter consulted informed insiders, compiling and refining a list of forty key individuals—ten from each of four major sectors of community life. He then applied sociometric methods to map patterns of interaction among them. In addition, he analyzed specific policy issues and conducted a separate study of leadership within Atlanta’s Black community, examining its relationship to the city’s white leadership.
Hunter’s aim was not simply to determine how many individuals held power, but to explore how different sectors were interconnected and how these relationships shaped community policy. He was particularly interested in how business-centered leadership managed social change by controlling the policy agenda. Atlanta’s business elite, largely insulated from the everyday struggles of ordinary citizens—especially the poor—formed a relatively cohesive and closed group. Through their control of economic resources, prominent civic roles, and informal channels of communication that facilitated consensus, they exercised significant influence over the direction of the community.
In his book The State in Capitalist Society (1969), Ralph Miliband challenges the idea that power in capitalist society is divided between a large number of groups fighting among themselves. Instead of this pluralistic view, he advocates and proves the view that the ruling class possesses a great concentration of power, and that it has a decisive role in creating ideology and politics. He believes that the ruling class has control over state institutions (police, army, judiciary, central and local government, and state administration) and that, through the control of these institutions, that class maintains its power. The ruling class is made up of those who possess economic power and who use that power to take control over state institutions, in order to maintain that economic power and stabilize capitalist relations. Ralph Miliband argued that the state acts as an instrument of the ruling class, or bourgeoisie, helping to protect its economic dominance, political power, and capitalist society. He believed that state institutions are controlled by elites, including politicians, senior civil servants, judges, and police and military leaders, who generally share an interest in maintaining capitalism and protecting private property.
Miliband suggested that these elites often come from similar social backgrounds to the bourgeoisie, attending the same schools and sharing family connections. As a result, they tend to share bourgeois values and introduce policies that benefit the ruling class. Even individuals from working-class backgrounds who reach elite positions may adopt these values. Miliband argued that judges prioritise protecting private property and that Labour governments have done little to challenge ruling-class dominance or redistribute wealth.
Furthermore, the ruling class uses legitimation to influence public beliefs and maintain support for capitalism. Advertising presents big business as serving society while encouraging people to associate happiness and fulfilment with material possessions and consumerism.
In the article "Politics and Poverty" (1974) Miliband notes that there is a large difference in power between well-paid manual workers, who can use the power of unions or resist capitalists through strikes, compared to the poor (unemployed, sick, single parents, poorly paid workers), who have neither personal nor organizational resources to fight for their interests.
John Westergaard and Henrietta Resler, in Class in a Capitalist Society (1976), argued that the ruling class uses its power to maintain wealth inequalities through promotion of ideology that sanctifies the capitalist economy, market and private property as rational, natural and legitimate.
Eric A. Nordlinger’s On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (1981) presents the state-centred approach to power, arguing that the state can act independently to influence and change society, even in democracies where governments are expected to follow the electorate’s wishes.
Nordlinger identifies three types of state autonomy. Type 1. autonomy occurs when the state pursues its preferred policies despite opposition from major social groups. It can strengthen its independence through secretive decision-making, offering rewards or appointments, using state resources against opponents, threatening policies that harm opposing interests, and creating mistrust among opposition groups. These strategies can weaken resistance and enable the state to act independently.
Type 2. autonomy occurs when the state persuades opponents to change their views and support its policies. Type 3. autonomy exists when state policies receive public support or face little opposition, often because social groups are uncertain about their preferences and allow the state to make decisions.
In Manufacturing Consent (1988), Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman analyze how the mass media manipulates public opinion and perpetuates the interests of those in power. The book argues that the mass media in the United States and other Western countries operates as a "propaganda model," in which a small group of powerful corporations and individuals control the flow of information and shape public opinion to align with their own interests. This is achieved through a combination of censorship, self-censorship, and the creation of a "filter" that screens out information that is inconvenient or contradicts the dominant narrative. Chomsky highlights five of those types of filters: ownership, advertising, sourcing, "flak", and "anti-communism".
One of the key components of the propaganda model is the "ownership" filter, which refers to the fact that a small number of large corporations control the majority of media outlets. These corporations have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo and promoting policies that benefit their bottom line, and they use their control over the media to shape public opinion in their favor. Another important component of the propaganda model is the "advertising" filter, which refers to media outlets relying heavily on advertising revenue to survive. This leads to a bias in favor of content that is friendly to advertisers, and a reluctance to report on stories that might be seen as critical of their interests. The "flak" filter refers to how powerful individuals and groups can use their influence to shape the media narrative. This can include things like threats of legal action, pressure from advertisers, or even direct censorship. The "anti-communism" filter refers to how the media has been shaped by the Cold War, particularly in its focus on the threat of communism and its portrayal of the Soviet Union as an enemy of the United States.
Noam Chomsky, in numerous books and articles, such as Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order (1996), Profit over People: Neoliberalism and the Global Order (1999), Rogue States:The Rule of Force in World Affairs (2000), Media Control:The Spectacular Achievement of Propaganda (2002), Power and Terror: Post-9/1 | Talks and Interviews (2003), and Imperial Ambitions (2006), presented his view of the power elites in the USA. These elites have a strong stake in promoting the interests of capitalism in general, and their own economic interests in particular. Their actions, and the actions of the USA and many other states, are in turn shaped by the operation of capitalism.
Noam Chomsky argues that political and economic power in the United States is concentrated in the hands of wealthy elites, large corporations and financial institutions. In his books, he explains how capitalism shapes government policies and how political decisions often serve the interests of powerful groups rather than the needs of ordinary citizens.
According to Chomsky, the USA is not a genuinely democratic society. Although citizens can vote, their choices are limited because the Democratic and Republican parties pursue similar policies and are heavily influenced by large corporations. These corporations have significant economic and political power but are not accountable to the general public. The high cost of elections further encourages politicians to prioritise corporate interests over those of ordinary people.
Chomsky is particularly critical of neoliberalism, an economic approach that promotes privatisation, reduced government intervention, lower taxes for the wealthy and cuts to public spending. He argues that these policies do not necessarily create greater freedom, democracy or prosperity. Instead, they increase corporate power, weaken citizens’ influence over government and reduce the state’s ability to provide welfare and improve living standards.
He also criticises the way government budget deficits are used to justify cuts to public services. Chomsky suggests that military expenditure and the inefficiency of the American healthcare system contribute significantly to government debt. Meanwhile, financial institutions, particularly banks, have gained increasing influence, often at the expense of industry, employment and vulnerable members of society.
Furthermore, Chomsky argues that the USA applies free-market principles selectively. While poorer countries are pressured by the USA and international institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, to remove trade barriers and subsidies, the American government continues to support its own industries through subsidies. This demonstrates that free-market policies are often used to benefit powerful American corporations rather than promote fair competition.
Finally, Chomsky maintains that the USA uses its economic, political, and military power to protect its global interests. It may undermine governments that threaten these interests while supporting authoritarian regimes that serve them. Since the end of the Cold War, American military dominance has strengthened its ability to influence other countries.
Hywel Williams, in Britain’s Power Elites: The Rebirth of a Ruling Class (2006), argues that a dominant ruling class has re-emerged in Britain since the early 1990s. He identifies three main power elites: political, professional, and financial/business elites. These groups maintain their power through their positions, control of financial resources, and use of language to convince the public that their authority is necessary and that there is no alternative.
Political elites include senior politicians, particularly ministers, MPs and members of the House of Lords, who work closely with senior civil servants. Williams argues that political parties have become increasingly similar, making democratic choices appear largely meaningless. Privatization and the growing influence of free-market policies have also reduced the government’s role in controlling the economy. Nevertheless, politicians remain influential because they connect different elites through their networks and relationships. They also maintain power through patronage, appointing individuals to public agencies and employing private-sector consultants to manage public institutions. These connections reinforce relationships between political, professional and business elites. Furthermore, elite positions are often passed down through family connections, allowing existing elites to reproduce themselves.
Professional elites have also changed. Traditional professionals, such as doctors, solicitors and teachers, have lost some independence because their work is increasingly controlled through targets, monitoring and evaluation. Meanwhile, the new professional elites focus on management, performance and delivering results. Rather than relying on specialist knowledge, they often use management jargon to justify their authority and control over others. Williams argues that professional success increasingly depends on satisfying the demands of the state or private businesses rather than developing professional expertise.
Financial and business elites are, according to Williams, the most powerful group in Britain. In particular, the City of London has become central to the British economy, gaining importance as manufacturing and traditional landowning wealth have declined. Political and professional elites must often accommodate business interests because financial institutions control significant economic resources. Links between government and business are strengthened by political donations, government contracts and the movement of former ministers, civil servants and advisers into corporate positions. Governments may therefore prioritise business interests, while public institutions and taxpayers help generate profits for private companies.
Williams concludes that financial and business elites occupy the highest position in Britain’s power structure. Their dominance has been strengthened by the decline of alternative sources of power, including trade unions and the Church. Even the Labour Party, traditionally associated with workers’ interests, has become increasingly connected to financial and business interests. Overall, Williams portrays British society as increasingly dominated by interconnected elites whose interests take precedence over those of ordinary citizens.
Bob Jessop’s books The Future of the Capitalist State (2002) and State Power (2007) examine how the state has changed in response to transformations in capitalism, particularly the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. He argues that Western societies have moved towards a globalized, knowledge-based economy in which innovation and international competition are increasingly important.
Although Jessop agrees with Marxist thinkers that capitalism strongly influences the state, he rejects the idea that the state is simply controlled by capitalists or always serves their interests. The state is institutionally separate from the capitalist economy and possesses operational autonomy, meaning it can make independent decisions that may benefit or harm capitalism. Its policies can reflect alliances between different social classes and competing political projects.
Nevertheless, capitalism exercises what Jessop calls ecological dominance over society in three main ways. First, capitalists can threaten to move their investments elsewhere if governments introduce unfavourable policies. Second, capitalism increasingly influences areas such as healthcare, education and scientific research. Third, market principles and profit-seeking logic are introduced into public services, even when these do not operate as conventional markets.
Jessop’s regulationist approach focuses on how states regulate capitalism and how their policies affect the economic system. He identifies a shift from the Keynesian welfare state towards the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. This transformation began around the mid-1970s, alongside the development of post-Fordism.
Post-Fordism involves a move away from mass production and mass consumption towards specialized products, knowledge-based production, and technological innovation. Globalization has intensified international competition, making centralized economic control more difficult. Consequently, states increasingly prioritize economic competitiveness over social justice and welfare provision. They encourage innovation and private enterprise through public-private partnerships rather than relying on direct state ownership and intervention.
The regime is described as postnational because economic policy increasingly focuses on international competition rather than managing the national economy alone. However, Jessop argues that the state remains powerful. Its role shifts from direct government towards indirect governance, creating favourable conditions for economic activity while relying more on networks, corporations and cooperation between organizations.
In Who Rules America? (2022), G. William Domhoff examines how economic elites exercise power over the American state and influence public policy. He argues that political power in the United States is concentrated in the hands of wealthy individuals, families, corporations, and financial institutions that own a large share of the country’s productive assets. Although businesses may pursue different interests on specific issues, they generally cooperate on broader objectives, such as reducing taxes, opposing labor unions, and promoting favorable trade agreements. Consequently, public policy tends to reflect the interests of the wealthy more than those of ordinary citizens.
Domhoff identifies a small social upper class at the top of the American wealth, income, and status hierarchies. He estimates that this group represents approximately 0.5–1% of the population. Its members share a common lifestyle, social networks, values, and worldview. Exclusive neighborhoods, private schools, country clubs, and cultural organizations help maintain social cohesion and transmit upper-class values to younger generations and newly wealthy individuals. These institutions also reinforce the belief that upper-class members are particularly capable of leading and governing society. According to Domhoff, this group owns approximately 35–40% of privately held wealth and receives 12–15% of annual income in the United States.
The upper class is closely connected to the corporate community, which consists of major corporations, financial institutions, investors, and business executives. Corporate unity is strengthened by shared interests in profitability, similar educational and professional backgrounds, and common opposition to groups such as labor unions and environmental organizations. Interlocking directorates, in which individuals serve on multiple corporate boards, connect many of the largest corporations. Although many chief executive officers do not initially belong to the upper class, they are gradually integrated into its networks and values as they advance professionally and accumulate wealth.
Another important source of elite influence is the network of nonprofit organizations, think tanks, foundations, and policy-discussion organizations. Funded by wealthy donors and corporations, these institutions employ experts, develop policy proposals, and shape public debate. They connect business leaders, academics, policymakers, and government officials, allowing corporate and upper-class interests to influence which issues receive attention and which solutions are considered acceptable. Elite universities also contribute by educating professionals and experts, while foundations influence research through their funding decisions.
Domhoff explains that members of the power elite influence the federal government through three principal processes. First, the special-interest process allows corporations and industries to influence taxation, subsidies, and regulation through lobbying. Second, the policy-making process transfers proposals developed by policy-planning organizations to government institutions. Third, the candidate-selection process enables wealthy donors and corporate leaders to influence elections through campaign contributions, particularly during party primaries. The movement of individuals between corporate and government positions further strengthens these connections, creating what Domhoff describes as revolving interlocks.
Ultimately, Domhoff argues that American democracy is limited by the disproportionate influence of economic elites. Political parties are often less responsive to voters than their public rhetoric suggests, while campaign financing encourages candidates to prioritize wealthy donors. Elections consequently tend to emphasize personalities and images rather than substantive policy debates.
In conclusion, Domhoff presents American political power as a system in which the upper class, corporate community, policy-planning networks, and government institutions reinforce one another. Historical divisions among workers, including racial and ethnic inequalities, have weakened their ability to organize collectively. As a result, working people possess less political influence than their counterparts in many other democratic countries, while economic elites retain a dominant role in shaping public policy and governing the United States.
Autonomous Power of the State
In his book Political Power and Social Classes (1978, in French 1968), Poulantzas develops the idea of the relative autonomy of the state. Unlike the earlier Marxists, he believes that the (liberal-democratic) state has a broader role than just expressing the class interests of the capitalist class. The state possesses relative autonomy from the individual interests of individual capitalists. As capitalists fight among themselves, the state must secure their general class interests, not side with individual capitalists. Precisely because the state acts as a mediator and arbiter between the various factions of the capitalist class, which gives it autonomous power.
The capitalist class and other influential classes are creating long-term strategies and alliances that Poulantzas calls "power bloc." The state mediates in all class relations and all aspects of those relations - economic, political, and ideological. The state in capitalism does not rule through repression, but by creating an ideological consensus between the capitalist and other subordinate classes. The state controls workers by isolating them into separate individuals (citizens) and thus producing what he calls the " effect of isolation". This concept refers to the phenomenon that individuals from subordinate classes enter into competitive relationships with other individuals from subordinate classes, or are part of a political faction, and thus remain isolated from the rest of their own class. By mediating and reducing class conflicts, both between and within classes, the state creates long-term stability and the illusion of pluralism. In a debate he led with Ralph Miliband, Poulantzas further developed his arguments about the autonomous role of the state. Poulantzas emphasized that civil servants, regardless of their class, accept a structurally determined role that is related to the professional position they hold within the state apparatus.
Theda Skocpol developed her theory of the autonomous action of the state in the book Bringing the State Back In (1985). She believes that states always have significant autonomy and the ability to achieve their own political goals, which may differ from the interests and goals of individual classes or society as a whole. The goal of every state is to increase its own power and influence. They achieve this by increasing the power and sphere of influence of the state administration and other state institutions. To achieve this, states must establish stable budget revenues through taxes and other revenue streams. States often increase their own power by recruiting the most capable and educated individuals as their cadres. A large and strong army is also a source of state power. Skocpol believes that the state structure can significantly influence the ability of different classes, even the most economically powerful ones, to pursue their own interests. Not all states have the same power to act autonomously, and that power depends on several factors: the military and economic power of the state; the level of sovereign control over its territory; the existence of regular sources of high budget revenues; the level of external debt (the lower the debt is, the more power the state has).
Culture and Ideology as a Basis of Power
Antonio Gramsci introduced the concept of "cultural hegemony". The ruling class in capitalist societies does not rule only through force and repression but imposes its own ideological system, which defends the interests of the ruling class, and other subordinate classes. This imposed value system is what Gramsci calls "cultural hegemony." Hegemony is a synthesis of political, intellectual, and moral leadership within the ruling class. This leadership justifies its interests by creating an image of the world that presents those interests and the economic and political relations that sustain those interests as positive for the entire population. When other classes (which Gramsci calls "subaltern") accept such a picture of the world as normal and common sense, or even better, as the only possible one, then those classes become integrated into that ruling cultural hegemony.
The capitalist class integrates subaltern classes in two ways. On the one hand, it gives them small concessions - workers' rights, allows the work of trade unions, creates a social security system, and the like. On the other hand, the state and civil society create institutions and organizations - educational institutions, the press, churches, and civil associations - that promote this cultural hegemony. In addition, the state creates institutions - police, army, prisons, psychiatric institutions - that carry out repressive measures against those who do not accept hegemony. The capitalist class also has its independent ways of achieving obedience, through the realization of control and punishment in the workplace itself, but also through employment itself, because most workers without capitalist employment cannot even survive.
Eric Wolf researches culture and political ideologies in his book Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis (1999). He argues that power relations are always present, but these relations depend not only on political and economic but also on cultural patterns. Ideology serves as a means of justifying power relations and domination, but the nature of that ideology will also depend on broader cultural patterns, as well as on the unique historical sequence of events in a society.
Michel de Certeau studies in various areas of sociology of everyday life, and his most famous book on the subject is The Practice of Everyday Life (1984, in French 1980). Certeau studies how people, in their everyday life, change the meanings and practices of socially established rituals and symbols. In his theoretical approach, the most important difference is between the concepts of "strategy" and "tactics". Institutions and other power structures produce and implement strategies, thus acting as producers of the symbolic order, while, on the other hand, individuals act as “consumers” who use everyday tactics in specific environments and circumstances. He gives the example of a city where authorities, institutions, and companies have shaped the look and the way it people should behave in it, while, in everyday life, ordinary people use tactics to avoid these rules of conduct. Those in power use strategies to create rules, while ordinary people use tactics to use those same rules as a means of creative resistance to power structures. Certeau believes that all strategies and tactics must be understood as "spatial practices", that is, they are always localized in space.
Power in Stateless Societies
Frederik Barth’s book Political Leadership among Swat Pathans (1959) was the product of fieldwork done in Pakistan among an ethnic group of Swat Pathans. This book focused on politics and power dynamics in Pathan society. Barth states that Pathans didn’t have any institutionalized political structure; instead, they had many leaders who competed among themselves. People who followed those leaders did so not based on kinship or group affiliation, but voluntarily, deciding for themselves who to follow. The relation between followers and leaders was “transactional”. A transactional relationship meant that leaders gave gifts and protection to their followers, and, in turn, follower gave their allegiance and armed support. The transactional relationship also meant there was no true loyalty to leaders, and if a leader lost his wealth or honor, his followers would switch their support to another leader. There were two types of leaders. The first type was secular leaders whose power came from ownership of land and fierceness in battle. The second type of leader was saints who got their power from being a moral and religious authority and through the mediation of feuds. The roles of these two types of leaders were complementary. Aside from the transactional model of relations, Barth also recognized the generative model in which the aggregate choices of individuals directed the processes which unintentionally generate new societal structural forms.
Marvin Harris, in Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures (1977), explores the political evolution of society. He argues that village societies most often arise with the beginning of agriculture. Those villages that lived in areas where it was possible to intensify yields were the first where individuals appeared whose main social role was to direct the process of yield intensification. These people are called "big men" in anthropological theory. The big men had three roles: the intensification of production, the redistribution of produced and exchanged goods, and the use of prestige and wealth to organize military or trade campaigns. The big men constantly strive to stand out among the villagers and to encourage them to increase production. The people who agreed to be part of the big man's support group had to give him a share of their surplus. At the end of the process of collecting surpluses, most often for some ritual celebration, big men distributed the surpluses in their group, and they themselves, most often, had the least. Big men must constantly prove themselves, and the title itself, in cases where it formally exists, is not permanent, but passes to new individuals as soon as they prove themselves better than the previous big man. Big men also do not have political power; that is, they cannot force people to listen and follow them by threat or force.
When the big men managed to achieve more permanent support, and when there was a parallel increase in the yield and population of the villages as well as an increase in warfare, they received official titles and positions. This position continued to have the functions of intensification, redistribution, and warfare, but due to its durability, it gained more and more power and eventually led to the position being recognized as a legitimate power - authority. This new form represents the rule of the chief, and in terms of political economy the chiefs use their function of intensifier and redistributor to their advantage, the tribute given to the chief is obligatory, and they themselves and those closest to them get the most after redistribution. When the tribute given by the subjects begins to take the form of taxation, the rule of the chiefs approaches the stage of the state.
Marc Auge, in Powers of Life, Power of Death: Introduction to an Anthropology of Repression (1977), argues that political power is not based in a single political institution, but is various institutional, intellectual, moral, and metaphysical forms. Power is an all-encompassing logic found in the virtual coherence of representations of the ideological.
Power in Premodern Monarchies
Marvin Harris argues that the states that arose in the valleys of large rivers were specific because the intensification of agricultural production depended on irrigation and river flooding, irrigation could be controlled by building and maintaining canals, while river flooding could be predicted by creating precise calendars. To maintain a large system of canals, a large centralization of decision-making was required, which led to an increase in the political power of the elite. Since the agro-management elite controlled access to the irrigation systems, they were able to remove all those who refused to submit to them. This relationship between technology and environment allowed Egypt, India, Mesopotamia, and China to have fundamentally similar political economies.
"Each had a highly centralized class of bureaucrats and hereditary despotic overlords who claimed heavenly mandates or were said to be gods in themselves. Excellent networks of government-maintained roadways, rivers, and canals liked every hamlet and village to provincial and national administrative centers. Each village had at least one important person who served as a link between the village and the central administration. Political lines of force ran in one direction only: from top to bottom. While peasants might sometimes own their land, as in China, the bureaucracy tended to regard private property as a gift of the state. Production priorities were set by state tax policies and by regular call-ups of village men and women for work on state-sponsored projects. The “state was stronger than society.” Its right to collect taxes, confiscate materials, and conscript labor was virtually unlimited. It carried out systematic censuses village by village to determine the available labor power and tax revenue base” (Harris, 1991: 235-236).
In these countries, there was the development of religions and philosophies that called for justice, mercy, and peaceful relations, and on the other hand, demanded submission to the authorities. However, rulers often had to resort to brutal force to punish disobedient subjects. Dynastic changes were accompanied by the decline in the quality of irrigation systems and the associated increase in the dissatisfaction of the subjects. The new dynasties renewed their hydraulic base and the power based on it. The special infrastructural peculiarities of hydraulic states conditioned the specific system of oriental despotisms, and in India and China, this form of production influenced structural and superstructural features until the twentieth century.
The type of states that developed in Europe is responsible for the development of capitalism. North of the Alps, the Gauls, Franks, Teutons, and Britons during the Bronze Age began to create increasingly complex chiefdoms that by the fifth century BC had crossed the threshold of the state. These states were secondary states created under the influence of the Mediterranean states. These states of the Gauls, Franks, and other peoples north of the Alps consisted of three hereditary castes: warrior aristocracy, clergy - druids who were in charge of rituals and calendars, and ordinary peasants who lived on small farms or as pastoralists. At the top of the power was a hereditary or semi-hereditary king who belonged to the ruling tribe, and had subordinate chiefs under him. Harris notes that most scholars classify the political formations that arose in Central Europe in the Bronze Age as chiefdoms, but he believes that they constitute true states. The rulers and their warrior chiefs tended to portray themselves as egalitarian distributors, while on the other hand, they had a monopoly on the means of force: chariots, horses, weapons, and swords.
Elias, in On the Process of Civilisation (2012), argues that, in with the rise of absolute monarchies in Western Europe, the state becomes more centralized and begins to monopolize the use of physical force and tax collection. It is the combination of control over the means of force and over cash flows that gives enormous power to the absolute monarch who imposes rules of conduct on the subordinate aristocracy at his court. The emergence of an absolute monarchy does not depend on the psychological character of the ruler but depends on the development of specific social structures, that is, figurations, which enable the emergence of absolute rule and a centralized state. The development of the division of labor, demographic growth, urbanization, the growth of trade, and the monetary economy, created the conditions for the emergence of an absolute monarchy. First, the war relations between the various feudal lords calmed down, which enabled the progress of the cities and increased the division of labor. In particular, the growth of trade and the monetary economy enabled the monarch to create an independent source of income regarding the feudal estates of the aristocracy. As the economic importance of land ownership declined, so did the economic and military power of the aristocracy.
The development of trade and the monetary economy also enabled the growth of the bourgeoisie, so the absolute monarch used this change in the relationship between the power of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, to increase his power even more. The development of centralized power conditioned the increase of administration and bureaucracy, which, together with the increase of the economic power of the bourgeoisie, enabled the emergence of a modern state. The process of development of civilization and civility is long and takes place over several generations. The main change occurred in relation to the source of control over individual behavior. In the Middle Ages, external coercion prevailed, while later, internal, psychological control of the superego began to be the main source of control over individual behavior.
In A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (1981, 1985), Anthony Giddens applies a structuration approach to the field of historical sociology. He applied this approach to history to the development of capitalism in Europe in the new century. The most important factors for the development of industrial capitalist society were: the development of administrative power, the creation of an abstract legal system, and the development of a bureaucratic apparatus in charge of tax collection. All three factors first developed within absolutist monarchies, and then expanded and strengthened even more with the advent of capitalism and the international system of nation-states. Wars and preparations for wars between European states have contributed to the concentration of administrative power, fiscal reorganization, and the consolidation of absolutism. The simultaneous development of capitalism, industry, and nation-states, after the fall of absolutism, was supported by the fact that each of these phenomena depended on and strengthened the others, while such development was made possible by a broader geopolitical context, as European states became politically and militarily dominant.
Power as Corrupting Force
John Acton had a pessimistic view of human nature, as he believed that all people desire to express power and domination over other people. To prevent this tendency, society has to place a limit on the authority any single person or institution can have. Besides the inherent tendency of people to have power, power itself corrupts those who wield it and brings out the worst in people – arrogance, vanity, masochism, egoism, etc. Acton's quote (by which he is most renowned), “Power tends to corrupt; absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely,” illustrates the worst of the corrupting side of power. He criticized the concentration of power in the hands of the central government, and that is why he was critical of the French Revolution, but praised the American Revolution, as it was based on ideals of individual liberties and freedoms, and it created a government that had checks and balances.
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